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The Vienna Circle and the Uppsala School 
as philosophical inspirations 
for the Scandinavian Legal Realism
Since the beginning of the 20th century the Swedish philosophi‑
cal scene was strongly influenced by the Uppsala School in philos‑
ophy, a current known for its hostility towards all forms of widely 
understood metaphysics. Rejection of metaphysics led the Uppsa‑
la philosophers to believe that the only reality we can meaningful‑
ly speak of is a spatio ‑temporal realm, to noncognitivism in terms 
of values and to the conviction that the role of philosophy is limit‑
ed to clarification of concepts through logical analysis. Such a brief 
description reveals a similarity between the Uppsala School and 
the Vienna Circle.
The representatives of the Vienna neopositivistic movement not 
merely formulated the verificationist criterion of meaningfulness, 
but also believed any form of unverifiable sentences (especially meta‑
physical stetaments and concepts) is to be removed from our sci‑
entific and philosophical language. This position led them to the 
radical form of empiricism, extremely controversial and widely crit‑
icized, though inspiring for contemporary philosophers. The emotiv‑
ist propositions formulated by philosophers inspired by Vienneses 
were a kind of implication of the acceptance of the noncognitivist 
approach in metaethics. Eventually, the only purpose of philosophi‑
cal investigations was considered to be the analysis of the language 
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of science; the proposals indicating its traditional tasks, like look‑
ing for the truth, were rated as illegitimate.
A sketchy analysis reveals a prima facie resemblance between 
the Uppsala School and the Vienna Circle. Both currents presented 
hostility towards metaphysics and claimed that reality should be un‑
derstood as a spatio ‑temporal order and asserted to non ‑cognitivism 
in terms of value ‑judgments.1 However, it should be remembered 
that the philosophical program of the Uppsala School was formulat‑
ed during the first decade of the 20th century, twenty years before 
Die wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung der Wiener Kreis (published 
in 1929). The main assumptions of the two mentioned schools (de‑
spite significant differences visible in a more thorough analysis), 
were coherent enough to provide a philosophical basis for the de‑
velopment of a new current in jurisprudence that is Scandinavian 
Legal Realism.
In our article we focus on two main theses of both schools, which 
influenced the Scandinavian Legal Realism to the largest extent. In 
the first section we describe and compare the anti ‑metaphysical as‑
sumptions of the Uppsala School (we focus on philosophical inves‑
tigations of the founder and the main representative of the school, 
Axel Hägerström) and the Vienna Circle: we point out obvious par‑
allels but also indicate a major difference, namely a basis for the 
rejection of metaphysics. Having presented ontological frameworks 
provided by both schools, we move on to metaethical noncognitivism. 
In the second section we indicate how these philosophical investiga‑
tions affected the theory of Alf Ross (1899–1979), probably the most 
recognized philosopher among the Scandinavian legal realists. In 
order to reveal the impact that the Vienna Circle and the Uppsala 
School had on his investigations, we will focus on his theory of le‑
gal validity and legal concepts. The reason for considering Ross is 
twofold. Firstly, he was the only philosopher among Scandinavian 
realists, who developed a theory, which was an attempt to accom‑
modate both Uppsala philosophy and the logical empiricism of the 
1 R. T. Sandin, The founding of the Uppsala School, “Journal of the History of 
Ideas” 23 (1962) 4, p. 496.
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Vienna Circle (while other Scandinavian realists relied mainly on 
philosophy of the Uppsala School). Secondly, Ross is considered to 
be the most prominent representative of the realist movement, prob‑
ably because his theory is the most sophisticated and thorough vi‑
sion of legal phenomena, while being a significant alternative for 
other movements in legal philosophy such as natural law theory, 
legal positivism, the historical school, but also other realist move‑
ments, especially American Legal Realism.
In the following paragraph we analyze the anti ‑metaphysical as‑
sumptions presented by both aforementioned currents. The hostili‑
ty towards all forms of widely understood metaphysics was certain‑
ly ‘inherited’ by all Scandinavian realists, and therefore requires 
a closer presentation.
1. The Uppsala School and the Vienna Circle: 
rejection of metaphysics
Philosophical aversion to the metaphysical speculations is nihil novi 
under the philosophical sole. One of the most famous quotes ex‑
pressing the striving for the elimination of not empirical (and math‑
ematical) reasonings can be found in Hume’s Enquiries concerning 
the human understanding and concerning the principles of morals:
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what 
havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or 
school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, „Does it contain any ab‑
stract reasoning concerning quantity or number?” No. „Does it contain 
any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?” 
No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but soph‑
istry and illusion.2
Therefore, the representatives of the Uppsala School and the 
Vienna Circle certainly did not propose an entirely new idea of 
2 D. Hume, An enquiry concerning human understanding, Oxford 1902, p. 165.
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anti ‑metaphysicism; they have rather formulated new arguments 
against the presence of metaphysics in the catalogue of meaningful 
philosophical disciplines.
Anti ‑metaphysicism of the Uppsala School arose as a result of 
the rejection of subjectivism. Such an approach was developed by 
C.J. Boström (1797–1866), under the influence of Berkeley’s esse est 
percipi principle. Boström maintained that the objects are merely 
correlates of consciousness.3 Boströmianism with its epistemolog‑
ical subjectivism provided an important background for the devel‑
opment of the Uppsala School. Axel Hägerström (1868–1939) and 
Adolf Phalen (1884–1931), two prominent Swedish philosophers, 
rejected Boströmian subjectivism. Axel Hägerström (who received 
the greatest recognition among all Uppsala philosophers), in Das 
Prinzip der Wissenschaft (1908) formulated so ‑called ‘thesis of reali‑
ty’, which provided the name for the new current, the Scandinavian 
Legal Realism.4 Hägerström pointed out that subjectivism strug‑
gles with the problematic issue of concerning possibility of perceiv‑
ing ‘something’ (an object) as independent from a subject. In oth‑
er words, the question is: how can the conscious subject recognize 
those aspects of the reality, which do not belong to the conscious‑
ness? Young Hägerström aimed at resolving the puzzle of subjectiv‑
ism basing on Kantianism, seeking to answer the question of how is 
it that the mind recognizes an object as ‘something’ separate from 
the mind. According to Kant, categories such as time or space, which 
allow for the separation of objects in experience, are merely certain 
forms of consciousness.5 Hägerström realized, that as a result of 
Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’, the object of consciousness is cre‑
ated partly by the cognizing subject. Hägerström, dissatisfied with 
the Kantian solution, proposed a ‘counterrevolution’ claiming that 
ultimately it is the reality that is given in cognition, and not merely 
the consciousness. As we may now see, metaphysics in the  modern 
3 R. T. Sandin, The founding of the Uppsala School, op. cit., pp. 489–499.
4 P. Mindus, A real mind. The life and work of Axel Hägerström, Dordrecht 
2009, p. 48.
5 R. T. Sandin, The founding of the Uppsala School, op. cit., pp. 503–504.
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philosophy – according to Hägerström – stems from the false theo‑
ry of knowledge. However, if one rejects subjectivism with its con‑
viction that the mind cannot apprehend directly anything but it‑
self, knowledge will be possible without reference to metaphysics.6 
Having that in mind, Hägerström claimed that acts and objects of 
consciousness are two distinct phenomena; what is truly given in 
cognition is an independent reality; in other words, ‘realism’ men‑
tioned in the ‘thesis of reality’ implied that objects have ontological 
autonomy. As we mentioned in the introductory remarks, Uppsa‑
la philosophers adhered to a narrow vision of metaphysics. Any‑
thing located outside of a spatio ‑temporal realm had to be rejected 
merely speculative. It is, however, important to underline, that ac‑
cording to Hägerström also mental states are ‘real’, as they belong 
to the world of experience “in so far as […] it is placed in time and 
its reality is hence only time ‑dependent.”7 Mental states do belong 
to the world of time and space, however indirectly. This assump‑
tion – as we indicate below – will be of importance for the Scandi‑
navian legal realists.
The rejection of metaphysics by Hägerström (and other repre‑
sentatives of the Uppsala School) found its clearest formulation in 
Hägerström’s motto: Praeterea censeo metaphysicam esse delendam 
(‘Moreover, I propose that metaphysics shall be destroyed’), a para‑
phrase of the famous words of Cato the Elder. This hostility towards 
metaphysics reflected in moral philosophy. Hägerström adhered to 
a noncognitivist, emotivist theory of values twenty years before the 
formulation of the program of the Vienna Circle. Such a novelty in 
a conservative Swedish society influenced by Boströmian idealism 
met with incomprehension, and attracted criticism towards Häger‑
ström whose theory was labeled as ‘axiological nihilism’.8 Häger‑
ström presented his metaethical views to the public during his infa‑
mous lecture entitled On the truth of moral propositions delivered in 
March 1911. Swedish philosopher outraged his listeners (along with 
6 R. T. Sandin, The founding of the Uppsala School, op. cit., p. 508.
7 A. Hägerström, Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft…, op. cit., s. 76.
8 P. Mindus, A real mind…, op. cit., p. 81.
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the chancellor of the Uppsala University Henrik Schück9) claiming 
that ultimately value judgments cannot be considered to be true or 
false. Let’s consider his conclusion in more detail. For Hägerström 
the consciousness of value or consciousness of duty is an expression 
of emotional experience. However if we claim that propositions of val‑
ue are of emotional kind, be have to agree – Hägerström claimed – 
that they cannot be considered as judgments.
Unlike the sensations, what we experience in the emotions lacks 
all spatial definiteness. It cannot be introduced therefore into a large 
whole as part of reality. Hence emotion as such is not an observation, 
not a consciousness of reality of the object, but the emotive quality is 
‘introjected’ into the ‘inner ego’. It is always an ego which is glad, sor‑
ry etc. Precisely because the emotion lacks all spatial definiteness it is 
ascribed to the ego as a spiritual world different from the spatial. […] The 
emotion as experience is conceived to be associated with the psycho‑
‑physical organism and accordingly with reality. But thus the emotion 
is always only real as experience. […] Words such as ‘pleasure’ and the 
like therefore always denote something merely subjective, something 
which lacks all reference to physical reality – unlike observation which 
indeed is conceived as subjective too (experience, consciousness), but is 
also a consciousness of something as being real. If these statements are 
true, emotive consciousness can never take the form of a judgment in 
such a way that the experienced emotive quality in the judgment can 
be determined as a part of reality.10
If moral propositions are not judgments, they cannot be consid‑
ered as true or false in terms of logic. Obviously the above quotation 
can trigger objections, but if one takes Hägerström’s considerations 
for granted, one have to agree to his conclusions.11 If however one 
9 P. Mindus, A real mind…, op. cit., p. 77.
10 A. Hägerström, as cited in: A. Ross, On the logical nature of propositions of 
value, “Theoria” (1945) 11 (3), p. 187.
11 Alf Ross, despite generally accepting Hägerström’s investigations, claims that 
his theory of feelings is not a conclusive argument for the assertion of the non ‑logical 
character of propositions of value: “Hägerström’s theory has the character of an un-
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is dissatisfied with Hägerström’s comments on emotive conscious‑
ness, it is possible to find other justifications for his noncognitivism. 
According to a less sophisticated argument such entities as moral 
values have no counterparts in all encompassing spatio ‑temporal 
reality. This ontological claim leads us to epistemological and se‑
mantic arguments. According to epistemological argument, it is im‑
possible to gain knowledge about values, as such knowledge can‑
not be subjected to empirical verification (because such values are 
‘alien’ to the accepted vision of reality). According to the semantic 
argument propositions of value lack reference, therefore we cannot 
use them as elements of meaningful description of reality (one can‑
not find any designate of ‘good’ in all ‑encompassing spatio ‑temporal 
framework). The theory developed by logical positivists may seem 
to be quite alike.
Much ink has been spilled over the philosophical output of the 
 Vienna Circle philosophers, therefore we will merely note the most 
relevant aspects of their refutation of metaphysical statements. 
Their point of departure is the idea of verification, according to which 
every meaningful statement is reducible to Protokollsätze (protocol 
sentences) – statements which describe direct experience or percep‑
tion. According to the neopostivistic epistemology, these statements 
are held to be the ground for meaningful sentences, theories and, 
in general, parts of knowledge. Theories that are not empirically 
based, cannot be reduced to such sentences and, consequently, it is 
not possible to verify them in the proposed, empirical way. In other 
words, the significance of a certain statement has to be conceived of 
as having a potential to receive direct or indirect experiential sup‑
port.12 In connection with the verificationist criterion of demarca‑
warranted generalization. He bases his analysis on certain typical cases (plea‑
sure), in which the emotion is clearly regarded as belonging to the ego as something 
subjective. He bases his general theory on this and than in virtue of it brands illuso‑
ry the cases in which emotive qualities, at any rate apparently, are regarded as be‑
longing to the surrounding world. I think that it is actually impossible to maintain, as 
a psychological description, Hägerström’a assertion that emotion has never any ref‑
erence to space.” A. Ross, On the logical nature of propositions of value, op. cit., p. 189.
12 T. Uebel, Vienna Circle, [in:] The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 
ed. E. N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna ‑circle/ (29.02.2016).
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tion, according to which merely verifialble sentences are to be evalu‑
ated as meaningful, all unempirical theories and concepts transpire 
as devoid of any meaning and, therefore, are useless.
As one can see, the elimination of metaphysics in the publica‑
tions of the Vienna Circle members was of different character (in 
our opinion is was a result of more philosophically sophisticated rea‑
sononigs) than in the Uppsala school, possibly due to the formalistic 
character of their philosophy and concentration on mathematized 
natural sciences, especially on physics (many of them were educat‑
ed in science, not merely in the philosophy).
The problems of ethics and axiology did not play an important 
role in the philosophical investigations of the Vienneses.13 The non‑
cognitivist approach did not appear in their important philosophi‑
cal publications. This “gap” was filled by Alfred Jules Ayer, British 
philosopher, inspired by the Vienna Circle members. In his famous 
book, Language, truth and logic,14 which was a kind of neopositiv‑
istic international manifesto, Ayer proposed an emotivist theory, 
which became one of the most important metaethical theories in 
the 20th century. His argumentation is partially similar to Häger‑
ström’s ideas, but one can note also relevant differences.
The principle of verification is of great importance in his reason‑
ing concerning the significance of moral utterances. Due to the fact 
that the statements expressing moral attitudes or norms are pre‑
scriptive (not descriptive), it is impossible to verify them in the em‑
pirical way. In Ayer’s opinion, these statements are expressions of 
the speaker’s feelings. In this context, his position is similar to the 
Hägerström’s (Ayer also denied such expressions were assertions). 
It may be simply noticed in his LTL. As he writes in the part enti‑
tled Critique of ethics and theology:
13 See, for instance: Ethik und Werturteilsproblematik im Wiener Kreis’, 
[in:] Von Bolzano zu Wittgenstein. Zur Tradition der österreichischen Philo­
sophie, Hrsg. J. C. Nyiri Wien 1986, pp. 162–172 (Schriftenreihe der Wittgenstein‑
‑Gesellschaft, 12/ 2).
14 A. J. Ayer, Language, truth and logic, London 1936.
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[…] statements of value are genuine synthetic propositions, but that 
they cannot with any show of justice be represented as hypotheses, which 
are used to predict the course of our sensations; and, accordingly, that 
the existence of ethics and aesthetics as branches of speculative know‑
ledge presents as insuperable objection to our radical empiricist thesis. 
In face of this objection, it is our business to give an account of “judge‑
ments of value”, which is both satisfactory in itself and consistent with 
our general empiricist principles. We shall set ourselves to show that 
in so far as statements of value are significant, they are ordinary ‘sci‑
entific’ statements and that in so far as they are not scientific, they are 
not in the lieral sense significant, but are simply expressions of emo‑
tion which can be neither true nor false.15
2. Alf Ross’ naturalized jurisprudence
While all Scandinavian legal realists espoused philosophy of the 
Upp sala school, Alf Ross combined both: the teachings of Hägerström 
and the logical positivism in one coherent legal theory. Hägerström’s 
contribution to Ross’ legal philosophy is particularly apparent in 
two of his books: Kritik der sogennannten praktischen Erkenntnis 
(1933) and Towards a realistic jurisprudence (1946). However, in 
his best ‑known work On law and justice (1953) Ross distanced him‑
self from the teachings of Hägerström and turned to the philosophy 
of the Vienna Circle. This change was not radical for two reasons. 
Firstly, what will become clear below, Ross did not consequently 
develop basic methodological requirements of Carnap or Neurath. 
Secondly, Ross’ theory of legal validity and legal concepts drew in‑
spirations from the basic naturalistic assumptions of both schools, 
which can be joined together without much controversy and with‑
out exposing his theory to incoherence. Jens Evald in his biogra‑
phy of Ross claims that: “His [Ross’] aim was not to disown Häger‑
ström but to present the Uppsala School as a philosophical school 
15 A. J. Ayer, Language, truth and logic, op. cit., p. 104.
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parallel to logical positivism.”16 Ross encountered logical empiri‑
cism of the Vienna Circle in 1934 when he became acquainted with 
Neurath who arrived to Copenhagen with lectures. Ross, impressed 
by the program of logical positivists, in a letter to Gunnar Myrd‑
al wrote that: “Influenced by Carnap and Neurath, representatives 
of the unitary science of Viennese philosophy, I have been inspired 
to continue certain epistemological problems, which have already 
been identified in Kritik […].”17 The two inspirations: the Uppsala 
School and the Vienna Circle constitute the greatest contribution 
for Ross’ legal theory.
Scandinavian realism was supposed to be an alternative to the 
legal theories that developed idealistic or partly idealistic under‑
standing of validity. According to Ross this idealism is best visible 
in natural ‑law theories and in Hans Kelsen’s normativism, how‑
ever it is present ‘in disguise’ also in legal positivism of Austin or 
Bergbohm.18 Legal validity is problematic, as legal norms are ob‑
viously social phenomena, but at the same time they are consid‑
ered to be a priori valid. Ross formulated this problem in the fol‑
lowing manner:
[…] it may be said that law is conceived at the same time as an ob‑
servable phenomenon in the world of facts, and as a binding norm in the 
world of morals or values, at the same time as physical and metaphysi‑
cal, as empirical and a priori, as real and ideal, as something that exists 
and something that is valid, as a phenomenon and as a proposition.19
Ross, who inherited Hägerström’s hostility towards metaphysics, 
saw the need to interpret the law and its validity only in terms of 
physical reality. Validity and reality are not two irreconcilable enti‑
ties, but two aspects of one phenomenon. Let’s once again consider, 
that inspired by Hägerström, Ross claimed that individual psycho‑
16 J. Evald, Alf Ross. A life, Copenhagen 2014, p. 220.
17 J. Evald, Alf Ross. A life, op. cit., p. 217.
18 See. A. Ross, Towards a realistic jurisprudence, Copenhagen 1946, p. 53ff.
19 A. Ross, Towards a realistic jurisprudence, op. cit., p. 11.
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logical phenomena fall into such spatio ‑temporal reality. Proposi‑
tions about the validity of law refer to a certain set of social and psy‑
chological facts. These facts are decisions of the judges.20 According 
to Ross a doctrinal assertion “A = D is valid law, is a prediction to 
the effect that D under certain conditions will be taken as the basis 
in future, legal disputes.”21 Lets now analyze elements of this defi‑
nition. Ross claimed, that scientific legal doctrine needs to be norm‑
‑descriptive, not norm ‑expressive:
Since the doctrinal study is concerned with norms, it can be called 
normative. But the term must not be misunderstood. […] Cognitive prop‑
ositions can naturally not be made up o norms (directives). They have to 
consist of assertions – assertions concerning norms, which again means 
assertions to the effect that certain norms are of the nature of “valid 
law”. The normative character of the doctrinal study of law signifies, 
therefore, that it is a doctrine concerning norms, and not of norms. It 
does not aim “setting up” or expressing norms, but at establishing their 
character of “valid law”.22
Assertions about valid law are predictions to the effect, that if 
an action is brought before the court, the directive for the judge will 
form a part of reasoning underlying the judgment. Here we need 
to move on to the most important contribution of the Vienna Circle 
to Ross’ theory of validity. Such doctrinal assertions are considered 
meaningful only if they undergo the procedure of empirical veri‑
fication (“a proposition about valid law is to be verified by fulfill‑
ing the prescribed conditions and observing the decision.”23) What 
makes that predictions possible, or – in other words – how can a le‑
20 Ross considered the decisions of judges to be the indications for the content 
of valid law, because judges, unlike layman, have coherent beliefs as to what is the 
law. Moreover the effectiveness of law – which for Ross is a condition for its validi‑
ty – can be best tested before the courts.
21 A. Ross, On law and justice, Berkeley 1959, p. 75.
22 A. Ross, On law and justice, op. cit., p.19.
23 A. Ross, On law and justice, op. cit., p. 41.
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gal scholar predict whether or not a judge will use a certain rule as 
a basis for his future decision?24
If […] prediction is possible, it must be because the mental process 
by which the judge decides to base his decision on one rule rather than 
another is not a capricious and arbitrary matter, varying from one judge 
to another, but a process determined by attitudes and concepts, a com‑
mon normative ideology, present and active in the minds of judges when 
they act in their capacity as judges. It is true that we cannot observe 
directly what takes place in the mind of the judge, but it is possible to 
construct hypotheses concerning it, and their value can be tested sim‑
ply by observing whether predictions based on them have come true.25
The shared normative ideology, which is shaped by the broad 
catalog of the sources of law, enables the scholar to form predic‑
tions. These sources are the acts of legislature, custom, precedent 
and ‘tradition of culture’.26 Some of these sources (like bills) provide 
stronger basis for predictions (the scholar considers them to have 
high probability of being applied by the judge) while others provide 
weaker basis (like a single precedent). From this it follows that pre‑
dictions are a matter of degree. Moreover, according to Ross rules 
themselves have a gradable character.27
Having briefly outlined Ross’ theory of legal validity, let us now 
consider his adherence to logical positivism. In On law and justice, 
Ross explicitly referred to principle of verification as to an import‑
ant basis for his predictive theory:
It is a principle of modern empirical science that a proposition about 
reality […] must imply that by following a certain mode of procedure, 
under certain conditions certain direct experiences will result. The prop‑
24 It is worth noting, that Ross claimed that predictions are not directed to the 
outcome of hypothetical future case, but are only to indicate which rule will be used 
as a basis for the decision.
25 A. Ross, On law and justice, op. cit., p. 75.
26 A. Ross, On law and justice, op. cit., pp. 75–78.
27 A. Ross, On law and justice, op. cit., p. 45.
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osition, for example, “this is chalk” implies that if I place the object 
under a microscope certain structural qualities shall appear; if I pour 
acid over it, certain chemical reactions will result; if I rub it on a black‑
board a line will show, and so on. This mode of procedure is called the 
procedure of verification and the sum of verifiable implications is said 
to constitute the “real content” of the proposition. […] The interpreta‑
tion of the doctrinal study of law presented in this book rests upon the 
postulate that the principle of verification must apply also to this field 
of cognition – the doctrinal study of law must be recognized as empiri‑
cal social science.28
In our opinion, his understanding of verification was however 
different from the one adopted by Carnap or Neurath. Ross’ under‑
standing of verification was significantly wider and simpler, as by 
‘verification’ he meant just occurrence of testable consequence (for 
neopositivists verification was rather, generally speaking, a less or 
more formalized procedure of checking the epistemic value of cer‑
tain sentences). Moreover, procedure of verification has been tra‑
ditionally applied to non ‑probabilistic scientific propositions, while 
Ross’ doctrinal propositions are probabilistic. Moreover, Ross nev‑
er proposed to reduce assertions about legal validity to protocol 
sentences, what would be required in order to consequently apply 
Carnap’s assumptions. Due to these factors discussion concerning 
the adequacy of verificationist approach does not affect Ross’ phi‑
losophy. Latter refutation of verificationism, the acceptance of con‑
formation and probabilistic approach in the philosophy of science 
seems to be irrelevant from the perspective of Scandinavian real‑
ist movement.
The second issue which is appealing in the light of antimetaphys‑
ical attitude of the Vienna and Uppsala philosophers is the status of 
legal concepts. Taking into account aforementioned aspects of Ross’ 
philosophy, the character of legal concepts may be analyzed from the 
new, naturalistic perspective. His relevant paper in this context is 
28 A. Ross, On law and justice, op. cit., pp. 39–40.
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Tû ­Tû, published in Harvard Law Review in 1957.29 The argumen‑
tation proposed by Danish philosopher may be interpreted as dou‑
ble track in the certain sense: on the one hand is based on his prag‑
matic approach, on the second on the anti ‑metaphysical position.
The first issue is of a great importance from rather practical than 
theoretical view, though it is also philosophically complex.30 At the 
beginning of the paper, Ross describes the customs of an imaginary 
tribe, Noit ‑cif, which lived at Noisuli islands. He pays special atten‑
tion to the problem of ritual purification. The word which is crucial 
in this procedure is the eponymous tȗ ­tȗ. Members of the society 
use it to indicate specific states of affairs, linked to the violation of 
social norms.31 In such a situation, the member who infringed the 
norm becomes tû ­tû and, consequently, his position in the hierar‑
chy rapidly goes down.
Further Ross explains the meaning of tû ­tû and ascertains the 
word has no semantic reference.32 It does not imply, however, the 
language of our tribe is devoid of meaning or ununderstandable. 
On the contrary, the statements including this utterance, are clear 
for the interlocutors. Moreover, the word which does not have real 
designates is an important element of the structure of tribe’s lan‑
guage. As Ross observes, assertion ‘x is tû ­tû’ occurs in definite se‑
mantic connection with a complex situation of which two parts can 
be distinguished:
(i) The state of affairs in which x has either eaten of the chief’s 
food or has killed a totem animal or has encountered his mother ‑in‑
‑law, etc. This state of affairs will hereinafter be referred to as affairs1. 
(ii) The state of affairs in which the valid norm which requires cer‑
emonial purification is applicable to x, more precisely stated as the 
state of affairs in which if x does not submit himself to the ceremo‑
ny he will in all probability be exposed to a given reaction on the 
29 The text was published earlier in Danish in Festskrift til dr. juris Henry Uss­
ing, 5. maj 1951, red. O. Borum, K. Ilium, Kobenhavn, 1951.
30 See: B. Brożek, On tû ­tû, “Revus” 27 (2015), pp. 15–23.
31 Ross describes inter alia these situations: “If a person x has killed a totem an‑
imal, x is tû ‑tû; If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is tû ‑tû”.
32 A. Ross, Tû ­Tû, „Harvard Law Review” 70 (1957) 5, p. 814.
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part of the community. This state of affairs will hereinafter be re‑
ferred to as affairs2.33
Then, through the analysis of some inferences, he demonstrates 
that tû ­tû is devoid of any meaning. In our opinion, his thesis is 
based not merely on such purely linguistic analysis, but also on the 
anti ‑metaphysical attitude, inspired by both the Vienna Circle and 
the Uppsala School, which we have already mentioned.
We should note that the reference of the legal concepts can be 
analyzed from at least two perspectives. The first, realistic, presup‑
poses that the subject of our investigations is a set of “legal facts”. 
They may be interpreted as sociological, psychological or even neu‑
roscientific, but, generally, are directly linked to the human behav‑
ior. The second, which can be called “metaphysical” (this term is 
obviously controversial), is based on the analysis of abstract legal 
concepts, to which a kind of ‘reality’ is ascribed.34 Such position is 
not acceptable for Ross and the rest of the Scandinavian legal schol‑
ars. As Hart remarked, Ross maintained that if a statement is not 
an expression of facts (which can be verified in the empirical way) 
or feelings it is a metaphysical statement.35 If a statement is meta‑
physical it is, according to the neopositivists, senseless. The same 
criterion is to be applied to the analysis of concepts; then, if a con‑
cept is not based on a empirically verifiable factors (or does not ex‑
press the facts), it is a metaphysical concept.
When we consider the concept of “obligation” and utterances it 
constitutes one can observe it is impossible – generally speaking – 
to empirically verify the meaning of such sentence. On the other 
hand, as it was previously stated, Ross’ understanding of the prin‑
ciple of verification was simplified and, in our opinion, not fully cor‑
rect. Therefore it would be interesting to consider whether the more 
adequate acceptance of the Vienna Circle proposals (certainly in the 
33 A. Ross, Tû ­Tû, op. cit., p. 814.
34 M. Jakubiec, Tû ­Tû Alfa Rossa a tezy skandynawskiego realizmu prawne­
go, [in:] Naturalizm prawniczy. Stanowiska, red. J. Stelmach i in., Warszawa 2015, 
pp. 205–206.
35 H. L. A. Hart, Scandinavian realism, “The Cambridge Law Journal” 17 (1959) 2, 
p. 236.
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analogical way) is possible and if can be useful for legal philosophers. 
However, such an analysis is to be a subject of an other research.
Summary
The Vienna Circle and the Uppsala School as philosophical 
inspirations for the Scandinavian Legal Realism
The Uppsala School in philosophy and the Vienna Circle are prima facie sim‑
ilar currents in contemporary philosophy. Both reject metaphysics, claim that 
reality is a spatio ‑temporal realm and adhere to noncognitivism in terms of 
values. However, justifications of these assumptions are quite different. In the 
following article we reconstruct main theses of both mentioned currents and 
then we indicate their impact on one of the major jurisprudential movements, 
namely Scandinavian Legal Realism. We focus on Alf Ross’ legal philosophy, as 
it was an attempt to accommodate both: the philosophy of the Uppsala School 
and of the Vienna Circle (while other Scandinavian realists referred exclusive‑
ly to Uppsala philosophy). We trace those two sources of inspiration in Ross’ 
theory of legal validity and of legal concepts.
Keywords Vienna Circle, Uppsala School, legal realism, neopositivism
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